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Sri Lanka is an exquisite little island, rich in colour, 
excitement and new experience.... Her people are warm and 
friendly... like the sun that smiles on Sri Lanka all through 
the year.... Absorb the serenity of the pilgrims come to 
worship at the feet of the Compassionate One. Sri Lanka is 
all things to all people... the serendipitous isle, where happy 
discoveries are made, the last lovely place where time 
means nothing and peace holds sway, a place to stimulate, 
excite, warm, relax, renew you. Sri Lanka... a place to take 
hold of your heart, (passage from a 1981 Ceylon Tourist 
Board brochure) 
...driving in from the airport to Colombo we found that the 
road was blocked on the bridge over the Kalani River. 
People had stopped their vehicles and a small crowd was 
gazing at the muddy monsoon waters swirling below.... 
What were they looking at?.... Bodies. They come here to 
see the corpses floating down the river.... Everyday the 
bodies float past, and on one day this week 50 were seen 
floating together.... They are always youths... bodies are 
found everywhere in Sri Lanka: on the beaches, along the 
roadsides, in the jungles, and in the towns. It is now 
customary to prevent recognition by burning the bodies 
with tyres, but others are thrown in the rivers as a warning 
to the living...". (The Guardian (London), 26 September 
1989. Cited in International Alert 1989, p. 5.) 
INTRODUCTION 
Human rights groups estimate that between 1983 and 1988 from twelve 
to sixteen thousand children, women and men have been killed in the violence 
that has devastated the small island-state of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) 
located in the Indian Ocean off the southern tip of India.2 Except for a five 
month period between January and June 1989, Sri Lanka has been under a 
state of emergency since May 1983. In these seven years Sri Lankans have 
suffered terrorist massacres; government security force attacks on civilians in 
retaliation for attacks made by some Tamil and Sinhalese extremists; 
indiscriminate security force bombings of Tamil areas (including schools, 
hospitals and temples); and mass arrests of citizens who are frequently held 
incommunicado, routinely tortured, and often killed while in detention.3 
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The response of the Sri Lankan government to the increasing discontent 
has escalated the violence to levels unprecedented in the island's history. The 
government has implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act (patterned on 
the South African model) and emergency legislation — both of which violate 
Sri Lanka's obligations as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The 1984 creation of "prohibited" and "security" zones in 
certain Tamil areas (including the entire coastline of the northern region) has 
destroyed any semblance of normal life in these areas by restricting 
movement of residents, closing down the entire fishing industry, and 
evacuating over fifty thousand families. 
The Sri Lankan government has come to view the "Tamil problem" 
exclusively as a "military problem." Former president J.R. Jayawardene has 
explained it as follows: "I shall have a military solution to what I believe is a 
military problem. After doing so I shall tackle the political side."4 
Accordingly, compulsory military service was reintroduced in October 1985 
and the eleven thousand person-army of 1983 has more than doubled in four 
years to over twenty-five thousand. The total strength of the security forces 
has increased from thirty-three thousand to approximately sixty thousand. 
The ethnic composition of the Sri Lankan military is almost exclusively 
Sinhalese. In a country where the per capita gross national product is a mere 
$363 a year, defence spending has increased seventeen-fold since 1981, and 
in 1987 the government spent $500 million on its war. Sri Lanka now spends 
approximately $1.3 million per day on the war. Such estimates, however, do 
not consider the human or other, more indirect, economic costs.5 
The signing of the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987, 
introduced 40-60,000 Indian soldiers into the fray with the intention of 
disarming the rather well-organized Tamil militants of northern Sri Lanka. In 
its first year, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) suffered the brunt of a 
guerrilla war and, only months after its arrival, its military involvement began 
to be labeled "India's Vietnam." The Indian Peace Keeping Force is 
estimated to be costing New Delhi between $1.37 and $3 million a day.6 
Conservative estimates produced by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in 
1988 put the number of people displaced by the conflict at over 250,000, 
which makes Sri Lanka the thirteenth highest "producer" of refugees in the 
world. Over 150,000 are estimated to be in the southern Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu alone.7 In the summer of 1986, the reality of the devastation in Sri 
Lanka touched Canada when a group of Tamils appeared on the shores of 
Nova Scotia seeking asylum. For many Canadians this was their introduction 
to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This essay examines why and how this 
country, once touted as a "model of development" and a "functioning Third 
World democracy," disintegrated into the present state of violence and chaos? 
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ORIGINS OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICT 
The early history of Sri Lanka is shrouded in myth. Fourth century 
Sinhalese Buddhist texts chronicle a history of kings and gods, myths and 
magic.8 In this mythic history, the Buddha visits Sri Lanka and establishes 
the island as the repository of his teaching, thus fusing Sinhalese Buddhism, 
nationalism and ethnic identity. A fundamentalist Buddhist acceptance of this 
mythic version of history is prevalent in contemporary Sri Lanka. Although 
the Sinhalese Buddhists constitute the majority group, the island is shared 
with Hindu Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims. In the centuries prior to the 
colonial period, the multi-ethnic society in Sri Lanka experienced periods of 
harmony, as well as conflict. 
The proximity of India and the importance of Sri Lanka in international 
trade made it inevitable that the ebb and flow of South Indian politics would 
affect Sri Lankan politics. South Indian invasions, court intrigue, and 
dynastic struggles occurred. When Portugal, the first colonial power, arrived 
in 1505, three separate kingdoms existed in Sri Lanka including the Tamil 
kingdom of Jaffna. Following Portugal, other colonial powers assumed 
possession of Sri Lanka: the Netherlands (1658-1795) and Britain (1795-
1948). Sri Lanka obtained a rather perfunctory independence in 1948 
following the violent and traumatic Indian struggle for independence. 
In Sri Lanka's early years, post-independence optimism tended to 
moderate ethnic antagonism. However, in the absence of a powerful foreign 
colonial ruler who could impose order and rules, domestic decision-making 
and the distribution of limited resources came to be influenced by ethnic 
group affiliation. Post-independence optimism rapidly evaporated and ethnic 
differences were thrust onto the political stage. The Westminster model of 
government adopted in 1948 changed to the current presidential system in 
1978, patterned after de Gaulle's Fifth Republic Constitution.9 
THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT 
The Sinhalese 
According to tradition, the Sinhalese originally migrated from the east 
and west coasts of northern India sometime in the sixth century BC. 
According to the most recent census of 1981, they are 72.5% of the 
population, numbering approximately 10.8 million.10 
1. Major Political Parties 
The conservative United National Party (UNP) and the socialist Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) are both popular among the Sinhalese. These 
parties alternately formed the government until the landslide victory of J.R. 
Jayawardene and his UNP in 1977, in which it won 85% of the available 
seats. The massive UNP majority in parliament allowed Jayawardene to 
effect a number of far-reaching political manoeuvres: he stripped the SLFP 
leader of her civic rights and expelled the only Tamil party from parliament 
by constitutional amendment; and extended parliament through a dubious 
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referendum, thus avoiding general elections for eleven years, i.e., from 1977 
until late 1988. 
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party, founded in 1951, was first led by S.W.R.D 
Bandaranaike — until his assassination in 1959 — and by his wife Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike, who maintains leadership of the Party. The SLFP thrives on a 
pro-Sinhala language policy and state support for Buddhism. It is vehemently 
opposed to the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord and has been suspected of 
"consorting with the JVP [Sinhalese extremists] in an effort to topple the 
UNP government."11 
2. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
The JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or Peoples' Liberation Front) is a 
Sinhalese Marxist extremist group. Its violence tends to be directed towards 
the state and its representatives, the UNP government and President 
Premadasa, for their "weak stance" against the Tamil militants. By the end of 
1987, the JVP was considered to be responsible for the murder of a number of 
UNP members of parliament and over three hundred government officials. 
The JVP was also blamed for an unsuccessful grenade attack on President 
Jayawardene and Prime Minister Premadasa on 18 August 1987.12 By the 
end of 1989, the JVP had become a serious threat to the very existence to the 
Sri Lankan state and the murders attributed to it are counted not in hundreds, 
but in the thousands.13 
An increasing number of discontented and alienated Sinhalese youth is 
turning to the JVP, hoping that it can provide the rapid and profound changes 
which the UNP and the SLFP have failed to deliver, such as the provision of 
gainful employment. It is estimated that the Sinhalese government has over 
fifty thousand security forces tied up in the southern section of the island, 
trying to contain the JVP threat.14 During the parliamentary elections in 
February 1989, reportedly some 70,000 troops and policemen were deployed 
in the south in an attempt to contain the violence.15 
3. The Sinhalese Buddhist Clergy (Sangha) 
The nationalistic Sangha has been used to legitimize government policies 
and behavior, and has provided a powerful means of fusing political and 
religious ideology. This fusion was clearly illustrated in the ceremony 
presided over by Buddhist clergy in which two of the most powerful ministers 
of the Jayawardene Cabinet pledged Buddhist oaths "to save Sri Lanka and its 
people from terrorism" and laid wreaths at the statue of King Dutta Gamani, 
a religio-mythic hero of the Sinhalese chronicles heralded for expelling 
Tamils from Sri Lanka.16 Members of the Sangha have also been associated 
with the JVP and anti-State activities. 
Anxiety over the threat of Indian and Tamil aggression is ingrained in 
Sinhalese culture. It has been reinforced over the centuries by a highly 
nationalistic and politicized Buddhist clergy, and, in particular, through 
religio-mythic Sinhalese Buddhist texts such as the Mahavamsa, the 
Dipavamsa and the Culmavamsa. 
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The Tamils 
1. The Sri Lankan Tamils 
Sri Lankan Tamils are of ancient South Indian origin. The historical 
period in which they migrated to Sri Lanka is difficult to determine. It is 
sufficient to state that they identify their roots in the ancient Tamil kingdom 
of Jaffna, in the northern part of Sri Lanka, at the time of Portugal's arrival in 
1505. Some Tamils use this point to argue that the northern Jaffna Kingdom 
should have been given statehood when Ceylon obtained independence in 
1948. 
The Sri Lankan Tamils constitute 11.6% of the country's population or 
approximately 1.7 million people. They speak Tamil, a Dravidian language 
completely different from Sinhalese, and are primarily Saivite Hindu. 
Approximately 80% live in the northern part of the island and are divided into 
two groups: the Jaffna Tamils of the north and the East Coast Tamils. The 
remaining 20% are located in the southern areas in the country, although 
increased attacks on the Tamils in the south have pushed growing numbers 
both northwards and out of the country. 
2. The Plantation Tamils 
A second major group of Tamils are often called "Indian Tamils", "Hill 
Country Tamils" or "Estate" Tamils. They make up 8% of the total Sri 
Lankan population and are the descendants of migrants from South India 
brought over by the British during the past century-and-a-half to work on the 
tea and rubber estates. Within the South Indian caste system, the Estate 
Tamils are of a lower caste than the Sri Lankan Tamils in the north of the 
island. This, as well as spatial distance, has contributed to limiting interaction 
between the two groups of Tamils. 
Shortly after independence the Estate Tamils were stripped of political 
rights and came to be viewed as a stateless people because neither India nor 
Sri Lanka would grant them citizenship. In February 1986, however, the Sri 
Lankan government unilaterally enacted legislation to accommodate ninety-
four thousand Estate Tamils. The Jayawardene government may have hoped 
to win the Indian vote for the UNP. However, by eliminating the citizenship 
issue, the Jayawardene government may have helped remove one of the 
barriers to closer cooperation between the Estate and Sri Lankan Tamils. 
3. The Sri Lankan Muslims 
The Sri Lankan Muslims are the descendants of Muslim traders who 
began settling on the island in the tenth century. They make up 7% of the 
national population or roughly one million people, and are mainly 
concentrated in the Eastern Province along the east coast of Sri Lanka; they 
are also dispersed in various parts of the island. Although they speak Tamil, 
the fact that they are Muslim rather than Hindu makes them distinct from the 
Sri Lankan and Plantation Tamils. 
The Sri Lankan Muslims occupy a key position both geographically and 
demographically. The central node of the Eastern Province is Trincomalee — 
one of the finest natural harbors in the world. This geographical fact is 
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strategically significant in the rivalry between the superpowers, as well as in 
South Asian (especially Indian) regional security. The Sri Lankan Muslims 
are pivotally placed in the precarious ethnic balance of the Eastern Province. 
They are a group capable of substantially helping or hindering either Tamil or 
Sinhalese initiatives to obtain political and military control. As a result, the 
Muslims have been both wooed and attacked by Tamil and Sinhalese 
extremists. 
The Sinhalese response to the Sri Lankan Tamil/Muslim majority in the 
Eastern Province has been a long-term plan to alter the demographic 
composition of the northern and eastern areas of the island, so as to increase 
Sinhalese representation and control of traditional Tamil areas. This so-called 
"West Bank Scheme" envisions the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of 
armed Sinhalese, trained in self-defence, on government-owned land in these 
areas.17 Over fifty thousand Sinhalese (ex-convicts, retired military personnel, 
and families displaced by the massive Mahavelli water project) have already 
been resettled on traditional Tamil land. Unable to affect the government's 
colonization policy, some Tamil militants have responded with violent attacks 
on these armed settlements. 
4. The Militant Tamil Groups 
The most prominent Tamil group in Sri Lanka is the guerrilla 
organization called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by the 
charismatic Veluppillai Prabhakaran. The LTTE is by far the most powerful 
Tamil group and the major Tamil military force in Sri Lanka. Like other 
militant groups, it had had major offices in South India — in Madras, 
Madurai and Tiruchi — until police crackdowns, under the terms of the Indo-
Sri Lanka Accord, forced them underground. Because of LTTE's 
demonstrated ability to hinder Indian- or Sinhalese-imposed solutions, it must 
be explicitly included in any viable peace proposal. 
A close ally of LTTE is the Eelam Research Organization (EROS). 
While EROS is a smaller organization, it too is relatively well-disciplined and 
well-organized. Other militant groups, sometimes in open conflict with 
LTTE, are PLOTE (Peoples' Liberation Army of Tamil Eelam), TELO 
(Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and EPRLF (Eelam Peoples' 
Revolutionary Liberation Front). These groups are smaller, less organized, 
and less disciplined than LTTE and have contributed to straining militant 
Tamil relations with both the central government of India and the state 
government of Tamil Nadu, by engaging in blatantly criminal activities and 
gun-fighting in South Indian cities. 
Social dislocation created by the influx of an estimated 150-200,000 Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees18 has also contributed to a decrease in South Indian 
support for Sri Lankan Tamils. The lessening of public support in 1987 
allowed the central government of India and the state government of Tamil 
Nadu to crack down on militant activities within India, in an attempt to 
pressure the militant Tamils to come to some type of agreement with the 
Jayawardene government. 
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5. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a political party formed in 
1976 in Sri Lanka, is distinct from the militant groups engaged in military 
activities. TULF was elected to the Sri Lankan parliament on a political 
platform that favored the creation of a "secular, socialist state of Tamil 
Eelam." Significantly, this position was later moderated to one which would 
accept "any viable alternative."19 Its representatives have been elected in 
virtually all areas where there are Tamil majorities. TULF was made 
marginal in Sri Lankan politics by its expulsion from parliament in July 1981. 
This came about when the UNP-dominated government, through the use of an 
extraordinary parliamentary procedure, approved a motion of non-confidence 
in the TULF leader of the opposition, A. Amirthalingam20 followed later by 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution which required all MPs to take an 
oath to the "unitary constitution" of Sri Lanka. TULF members of parliament 
were subsequently expelled when they refused to take an oath of loyalty 
under which they would have renounced even peaceful efforts towards 
separatism in the north (the Sixth Amendment). This expulsion alienated the 
Tamil community from the parliamentary process. Consequently, political 
grievances came to be expressed more and more through the actions of 
militant Tamil groups. 
India 
The inherent geopolitical reality of the South Asian security system is its 
Indo-centric nature. That is, if any international or domestic conflict 
threatens to upset regional stability, then the attention of the government of 
India will inevitably be aroused. As a result, India has always been perceived 
as a threat by the government of Sri Lanka. 
During the colonial period, the fear of India tended to be eclipsed by the 
presence of the colonial powers. However, the misgivings about Indian 
aggression returned at independence in 1948 and, accordingly, a Ceylon-UK 
Defence Agreement was immediately signed. Suggestions made by some 
Indian leaders in 1948, for the creation of a regional confederation to ensure 
India's security, only served to exaggerate Sri Lankan fears. Furthermore, 
India's intervention in the 1971 Bangladesh crisis illustrated to the Sri Lankan 
government that India was not averse to flexing its muscles as the hegemonic 
state in the region. 
The Jayawardene government wanted to counteract Indian influence in 
the Sri Lankan conflict, mindful of the fact that the Indian government had 
tacitly accepted the presence of militant Tamil training bases in Tamil Nadu 
since the early to mid-1980s. The Sri Lankan government requested and 
received the assistance of a number of other countries, which may have 
served to make India more nervous about the intrusion of foreign powers into 
South Asian affairs. As well as obtaining defence equipment from South 
Africa, and intelligence and counter-insurgency training from Israel, Sri 
Lanka received training and equipment from two of India's most threatening 
neighbors — Pakistan and China.21 It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
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government of India constructed the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord explicitly 
to prevent external powers from meddling in "India's backyard."22 
The Government of India is acutely aware that Sri Lanka could be used 
by foreign powers to gain access to India's exposed southern flank (including 
its submarine base in Cape Comorin, and air bases in Kerala). Because of 
these national security concerns, the Indian Government wants domestic 
conditions in Sri Lanka stabilized, at least to the point where external powers 
cannot possibly exploit the ethnic conflict to gain a foothold in the region. 
The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, and the introduction of sixty 
thousand Indian troops into Sri Lanka, has enabled India to block foreign 
power involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict. However, it has also 
introduced Indian troops into a quagmire which has had divisive 
repercussions within India. 
The dominant political dynamic within India is the tension between the 
central government and the state governments, exacerbated by the well-
recognized Indian phenomena of regionalism, factionalism and 
communalism. This is an important consideration in a discussion of ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka because it sheds light on actions taken by the state 
government of Tamil Nadu which do not appear to correspond to central 
government directives (for example, the unsuccessful 3 June 1987 
humanitarian flotilla to aid the Jaffna Tamils who were under siege by the Sri 
Lankan military). Tamil Nadu has long been the southern pole of a north-
south regional split in India. Nonetheless, the Tamil Nadu state government 
was the critical intermediary between the central government of India and 
various Tamil militant groups of Sri Lanka. 
THE DOUBLE MINORITY COMPLEX 
The fact that the Sinhala language and culture have no centre outside of 
Sri Lanka has helped to create both a siege mentality and a regional minority 
complex among the Sinhalese. That is, although the Sinhalese are a majority 
within Sri Lanka, they nonetheless perceive themselves to be a minority in 
relation to the fifty million Tamils of Southern India. Thus, the 
categorization of groups into minority Tamils and majority Sinhalese masks a 
phenomenon which could be termed a "double minority complex." This 
complex is one of the unique characteristics of die current Sri Lankan conflict 
and exercises considerable influence on the perceptions and behavior of both 
the Sinhalese and Tamil parties to the conflict. A senior diplomat in Sri 
Lanka's capital, Colombo, sums it up well: "There are three minorities in this 
country: the Tamils, the Muslims, and the Sinhalese."23 
THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 
Unlike the Indian experience, Sri Lanka's attainment of independence 
was notably untraumatic. In effect, Sri Lanka's independence followed on 
the coattails of the Indian struggle for independence. The British left Sri 
Lanka amicably and were perceived as a trustworthy ally by both the 
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Sinhalese and Tamil elites (as evidenced in the 1948 Ceylon-UK Defence 
Pact). Many members of the indigenous Tamil and Sinhalese elites had 
studied in England, which contributed to the nurturing of an affinity with the 
British. As importantly, substantial British economic interests in Sri Lanka at 
independence (and presently) made preserving a friendly relationship with the 
former colonial power an expedient course of action. In the initial period 
following independence, the bonds between the elites of the two groups 
engendered a sense of "Ceylon-ness" which took precedence over the ethnic 
divisions, especially since the English language remained a common medium 
of communication and the medium of instruction in the secondary schools 
and university. 
Gradually, however, post-independence cohesion eroded. The Tamils of 
both Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka share a similar "historical accident" in that 
both experienced extended periods of English language education which 
worked to their benefit during (and subsequent to) colonial rule. The Sri 
Lankan Tamils, as well as other minorities on the island, mastered the English 
language and excelled in the British administrative system as well as the 
professions. Various suggestions have been put forward to explain the 
apparent advantaged position of the Sri Lankan Tamils at independence: 
British "divide and rule" policy; access to superior English medium 
education; economic necessity (i.e., the poor quality of land in the traditional 
Tamil areas forced them to earn a living in non-agricultural activities like 
business); Tamil "industriousness." No doubt each suggestion contributes to 
the explanation. However, the consequence of this phenomenon was that, at 
independence, the Tamils came to be viewed by the Sinhalese as being "over-
represented" in higher education (particularly engineering and medicine), the 
professions, and the civil service. This became a source of discontent and a 
political target for Sinhalese nationalists. 
The ethnic differences proved to be a temptation too strong not to be 
exploited and manipulated by politicians who quickly learned that an ethnic 
majority could be transformed into an electoral majority. It was the 
harnessing of ethnicity for political purposes and the explicit cultivation of 
Sinhalese nationalism that first swept the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) 
under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, to power in 1956. It is the 
same strategy that is prevalent in contemporary Sri Lanka. 
As the Sinhalese nationalists assumed control of the government through 
the electoral process, they enacted legislation which limited Tamil 
employment and educational opportunities. As a result, the Tamil's share of 
government jobs dropped from 50% to 11% between 1956 and 1980.24 
Sinhalese control of university education was instituted in 1971 through a 
government-initiated admissions scheme. Tamil youths were required to 
score higher on entrance tests, and were subjected to district quotas, which 
drastically restricted Tamil admission to university programmes (especially 
engineering and medicine).25 
A "Sinhala-only" language policy adopted in 1956 served to increasingly 
marginalize Tamils and restrict their access to education and employment 
(particularly government service). A compromise was reached between the 
49 
Spring 1990 
government and the Tamil community in 1957 (the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact), allowing the use of Tamil in Tamil districts as well as 
providing for Tamil regional councils with powers in agriculture and 
education among other important areas. However, the Buddhist reaction 
rallied by the Sangha and J.R. Jayawardene — then a leading UNP member 
of the opposition — was so strong that the compromise agreement was 
dropped. As early as 1956, "language riots" began to flare up, resulting in the 
deaths of hundreds. Thousands of Tamil refugees fled from the Sinhalese 
south to Tamil areas in the north.26 Thus, the elevation of Tamil and English 
to the status of official languages, under the terms of the India-Sri Lanka 
Accord of July 1987, is intended to alleviate ethnic tensions rooted in 
language discrimination. However, the efficacy of this action can be 
determined only after thorough and conscientious implementation. 
CONFLICT ESCALATION: 1977-1987 
The 1977 landslide victory of J.R. Jayawardene's UNP over the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party was followed by an outbreak of violence. Although it 
began as a confrontation between UNP and SLFP supporters, it was quickly 
redirected towards both the Sri Lankan Tamils resident in the Sinhalese south, 
and the Plantation Tamils in the Central Province. Perhaps because the 
defeated SLFP had earlier extended its rule under unpopular emergency 
legislation, Jayawardene was hesitant to declare a state of emergency. The 
widespread killings, assaults, rapes, looting and destruction were allowed to 
continue over a period of two weeks. Thousands of Tamil refugees were 
pushed northwards in search of security. The violence reinforced Tamil 
distrust of government promises to improve Tamil-Sinhalese relations.27 
In August 1981, the next wave of communal violence swept the island. 
Increased Tamil militancy in the north, the detention of Tamil youths 
incommunicado, and the retributive police looting and arson in Jaffna 
escalated tensions; but now the violence was organized and systematic. 
Tamil sources claimed that attacks had been organized by "people close to the 
government" and that the police and armed forces did not intervene until a 
state of emergency was declared days after the violence had begun.28 
President Jayawardene stated: "I regret that some members of my party have 
spoken in Parliament and outside words that encourage violence, and the 
murders, rapes and arsons that have been committed."29 
Despite Jayawardene's expression of regret, the government was unable 
to avoid the anti-Tamil violence that erupted in July 1983, when thirteen 
Sinhalese soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tamil militants in Jaffna. 
This incident is usually identified as the cause of this round of violence, but it 
is more accurate to identify the ambush as the match that lit the fuse to the 
powder-keg of ethnic tension. Extremist Sinhalese groups used the ambush 
effectively to rally another organized war on Tamils throughout the island. 
Eyewitness reports stated that, where the armed forces were present during 
acts of violence, they would either stand by and ignore, or actually participate 
in, the attacks on Tamils and their property.30 Similarly, on 25 and 27 July, 
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fifty-three Tamil political prisoners, arrested under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, were murdered at Welikade Prison in Colombo while soldiers 
and prison officials stood by. Official estimates of the number of persons 
killed in the violence of the last week of that July is just under four hundred. 
Conservative, unofficial estimates are around two thousand.31 
From the carnage of 1983, the ethnic violence escalated into a civil war 
in 1986-1987. Civilian Tamil communities were subjected to the terror of 
both the Sinhalese military and Tamil guerrilla groups. By comparison, very 
few Sinhalese civilians were attacked by Tamil militants, despite repeated and 
frequent atrocities carried out by the security forces upon unarmed Tamils.32 
Conditions deteriorated to the point where, in January 1987, the 
Jayawardene government imposed a fuel and economic blockade on all of the 
Tamil areas of northern Sri Lanka — essentially putting the entire area under 
siege — and simultaneously initiated a full-scale military offensive, which 
included regular artillery shelling and air raids on residential areas containing 
hospitals, schools and temples, as well as Tamil homes.33 The justification 
for these actions was offered by an official government spokesperson: "The 
government reserves the right to attack such targets 'till such time as the 
killing of civilians is stopped, and the peace process is allowed to continue."34 
The rhetoric of Sinhalese political leaders became increasingly antagonistic, 
as illustrated in the speech in parliament by Prime Minister Premadasa on 24 
April 1987: "When the lives of our people are in danger, we are not prepared 
to go in for a political solution ... any friend who tells us to find a political 
solution will be considered as the biggest enemy."35 
Until this stage in the conflict, the central government of India had been 
erratically trying to play the role of mediator through the offices of the state 
government of Tamil Nadu in Madras. However, the political jostling 
between the state government and the central government of Rajiv Gandhi's 
Congress I Party served to hinder communication and mediation efforts. 
As the Jayawardene government became set on the "final military 
solution," the Indian government found itself unable to influence events 
within Sri Lanka. As a result, India's credibility as a mediator rapidly 
evaporated. The Indian parliament and media responded by stepping up their 
calls for direct intervention by Indian troops. However, the first step towards 
direct Indian intervention came not from the central government in New 
Delhi, but from the state government of Tamil Nadu in Madras, in the form of 
a "humanitarian flotilla" of aid that sailed from the Tamil Nadu port of 
Rameshwaram to Jaffna on 3 June 1987. Not surprisingly, the Sri Lankan 
Navy quickly blocked the flotilla and forced it to return. However, not to be 
outdone, me following day Indian Air Force cargo planes, flanked by Mirage 
2000 fighter jets, succeeded in dropping twenty-two tons of emergency relief 
supplies into Jaffna.36 
Indian intervention was preceded by a period of intense negotiation 
between the governments of India and Sri Lanka. No doubt a central 
consideration in Jayawardene's mind was the fear that India might be 
planning a more long-term intervention strategy if the conflict continued to 
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threaten regional stability. However, the Tamil militant groups could not be 
persuaded to participate in the negotiations, primarily because the "on-again-
off-again" actions of both the Sri Lankan and Indian governments had eroded 
their trust. The result of negotiations was the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 29 
July 1987. 
The Accord was an important point in the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict 
because it marked the redefinition of India's role from mediator to power 
broker. The Accord restructured the conflict and pushed it into a new stage. 
In the regional context, the Accord allowed India to assert its status as a 
hegemonic state and to exclude outside power involvement in the Sri Lankan 
conflict. Under the terms of the Accord, India acquired substantial control 
over Sri Lankan foreign policy: Sri Lanka must ensure that foreign military 
and intelligence personnel on its territory would "not prejudice Indo-Lankan 
relations"; Sri Lanka must ensure that Trincomalee and other ports would 
"not be made available for military use by any country in a manner 
prejudicial to India's interests"; India would undertake with Sri Lanka the 
restoration and operation of the Trincomalee oil tank facilities; and Sri Lanka 
must ensure that all foreign broadcasting facilities on its soil would "be used 
solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence 
purposes." For its part, India agreed to provide training facilities and supplies 
to the Sri Lankan military; "deport Sri Lankan citizens found to be engaging 
in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism"; disarm the 
Tamil militants and "establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka."37 
The success of the Accord rested on the ability of the Indian government 
and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to convince, or coerce, the Tamil 
militants to enter into negotiations on Indian terms. However, the exclusion 
of the militants from the Accord's formulation and its presentation to them as 
a fait accompli, made their acquiescence unlikely from the start. The 
subsequent refusal of the LTTE to endorse the Accord made it highly unlikely 
that the document would lay the foundation for a lasting peace in Sri Lanka. 
Direct military confrontation with the Tamil guerrillas began shortly after 
the IPKF arrived in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government decided to disarm 
forcibly the LTTE and pursue a military option in order to obtain control of 
the Tamil areas. As a result, by 15 December 1987, the IPKF had lost 350 
men with 1,100 more wounded.38 By the time the Indian troops left on 24 
March 1990, it was estimated that 1,155 soldiers of the IPKF had been killed 
and 2,984 wounded.39 The quick foreign policy victory that Prime Minister 
Gandhi may have been hoping for — in part, to buoy up his sagging domestic 
popularity — seemed to have backfired. Indeed, by cracking down on Tamil 
militants in South India and by pursuing its new role as power broker, India 
lost the leverage it once had over the Tamil militants and may have actually 
sacrificed its ability to play peacemaker in the conflict. 
The introduction of Indian troops into the north of the island allowed 
Jayawardene to redeploy Sinhalese troops to the south in an attempt to stem 
the tide of rapidly escalating violence by Sinhalese extremists, the JVP. 
However, Sri Lanka's foreign policy concessions to India provoked reactions 
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from a large number of Sinhalese nationalists. Reaction was especially strong 
among the Buddhist clergy and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, but there were 
also objections from within me UNP itself, including then Prime Minister 
Premadasa. Thus, while the Accord might have enabled Jayawardene to 
buttress his government militarily, it weakened party loyalty at a time when 
the government was bracing itself against unprecedented political and 
military challenges from Tamil and Sinhalese extremists in the north and 
south of the island. 
THE PRESENT: 1987-1990 
Following the signing of the Accord, Jayawardene found himself stuck 
between a rock and a hard place as Sinhalese and Tamil extremists became 
more and more polarized. Jayawardene's age, eighty-two, gave rise to 
jostling within his party by members waiting to replace him. Dissension 
within the party grew as members competed for political support by 
aggravating and pandering to Sinhalese fear. Internal party discord was 
illustrated in the resignation of Jayawardene's long-time finance minister — 
since 1977 — Ronnie De Mel, who crossed the floor to the hard-line 
opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in mid-1988. No doubt, volatile 
party politics and the on-going violent dislocation of Sri Lankan society 
contributed to Jaywardene's decision not to run in the December 1988 
presidential elections. However, the same political landscape confronts the 
new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa. 
The period from July 1987 to March 1990 contains elements of both 
change and continuity. Most conspicuous, is the change in the heads of state 
of both India and Sri Lanka. In India, V.P. Singh and the Janata Dal 
government replaced Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress I Party. In Sri Lanka, 
Ranasighe Premadasa was elected President and his United National Party 
won a majority in the election of early 1989. These changes may allow both 
the Indian and Sri Lankan governments more room for manoeuvre since 
neither leader is personally constrained by their predecesor's policy 
trajectory. Indeed, this may have been an important factor contributing to an 
agreement to finally send the Indian troops home. 
In March 1990, it was reported that the last of the Indian Peace Keeping 
Forces had finally been pulled out of Sri Lanka.40 The political costs of 
keeping the IPKF in Sri Lanka had risen too high for both New Delhi and 
Colombo. For India, the death toll of Indian soldiers mounted and domestic 
criticism grew louder as it sank deeper into what increasingly appeared to be 
a no-win guerrilla war. For Colombo, the domestic opposition to the IPKF 
fuelled the flames of anti-government Sinhalese extremism almost to 
breaking point. Ultimately, the IPKF succeeded in galvanizing almost all 
major factions in Sri Lanka against it. Premadasa has attempted to use the 
wide-spread opposition to the IPKF to his advantage. In May 1989, formal 
peace talks began with the LITE, even while the Tigers were militarily 
engaged with the IPKF.41 Then, in June 1989, Premadasa publicly demanded 
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that India withdraw its troops by the end of July. With some reluctance and 
delay, the Indian troops were finally pulled out. 
The removal of the IPKF may help to increase domestic support for 
President Premadasa while weakening support for the JVP. However, the 
withdrawal has removed the military pressure on LTTE to negotiate with 
Colombo. By removing the IPKF buffer zone between Tamil and Sinhalese, 
the government is now confronted with the dangerous possibility of a two-
front civil war if the LTTE talks do not succeed; against the JVP in the south 
and against the LTTE in the north. 
The spectre of even further violence looms large on the Sri Lankan 
horizon in light of the rapid increase in the strength of the JVP and its ability 
to challenge the government's authority in the south through a wide-spread 
and effective programme of terror. Sadly, the JVP violence has elicited an 
equally deliberate policy of repraisals by government security forces, 
including police.42 Recent reports have documented in grim detail the 
violence in the south.43 
Violence spilling-over into Tamil Nadu has increased and consequently 
the Tamil Nadu government's position towards Sri Lankan Tamils has 
hardened. In March 1990, the Tamil Nadu government refused permission 
for two passenger vessels carrying over 1,200 Sri Lankan Tamil refugess to 
berth at Madras harbor. The decision came in the wake of growing violence 
involving Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu including a shoot-out in 
Ramanathapuram district in which two policemen were killed and over a 
dozen civilians injured in an exchange of fire between Tamil militants and 
local police.44 While the vessels were not permitted to dock in Tamil Nadu, 
they were re-routed to another Indian port further north. To make sense of 
the State Government's decision, it is necessary to point out that the vessels 
were believed to be carrying EPRLF militants, their families, and "large 
quantities of arms".45 If the vessels were, indeed, carrying armed EPRLF 
militants then the incident can be viewed as a consequence of the Indian 
government's policy of financially and militarily supporting the EPRLF in 
order to off-set the strength of LTTE in the north. The withdrawal of the 
IPKF not only removes the buffer between the Sri Lankan military and LTTE, 
it also eliminates much of the support base for the EPRLF, which was forced 
to rely on Indian government patronage to make up for lack of popular Tamil 
support. Clearly, the flight by EPRLF members — including Varatharaja 
Perumal, Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Province — is based on the fear 
that the LTTE's reassertion or "consolidation" of control in the North and 
North-East will be bloody. 
The dynamics of violence may have altered, but violent death and 
teetering civil war are still dominant facts of life in Sri Lanka. In January 
1989, emergency regulations were lifted only to be reimposed in June of the 
same year.46 While Premadasa is on the public record as declaring his 
aversion to the use of violence, his Foreign Minister Ranjan Wijeratne has 
told Western correspondents: "We have to deal with terrorists in the most 
ruthless manner... we have taken a hard line. There is no question about 
that."47 Acting in his capacity as deputy defence minister, Wijeratne 
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announced a series of measures to deal with the growing JVP violence and 
control in the south: "We have given orders to shoot at sight, arrest, detain, or 
deal with inciters including trade union officials, strikers and all 
troublemakers attempting to disrupt normal life."48 
An important wild card in future violence is the role of India. Having 
gone from being an ineffective mediator to an ineffective power broker, the 
question that remains is what role it will play in the future. Although India 
may be unable to impose a settlement, it is able to inhibit a settlement. Thus, 
India will continue to be a major factor in any attempt to manage and resolve 
the Sri Lankan conflict. 
THE FUTURE 
In 1962 and 1966, factions within the army and police attempted two 
coup d'etats.49 More recently, there is evidence that the rapid increase in the 
Sri Lankan military has enabled substantial JVP infiltration.50 President 
Premadasa may have yet another front of opposition to contend with if the 
military decides to assume a role in domestic politics, beyond the constraints 
of constitutional structures. 
A certainty in any conflict, but particularly true of ethnic conflict, is that 
the longer it continues, the deeper it becomes entrenched and the further it 
becomes institutionalized. The ability to resolve, let alone manage, the 
conflict becomes increasingly difficult. The present generation of Sinhalese 
and Tamil youth are growing up in conditions in which polarized and 
antagonistic relations between ethnic groups is the norm. Through the media, 
through school textbooks, and most of all, through the attitudes and behavior 
of their parents, the youth of Sri Lanka are learning a culture of ethnic 
violence. Once an entire generation has been affected, the society will 
witness the outbreak of a new and more hardy strain of ethnic hatred. 
The Tamil community's trust in the Sri Lankan government has been 
severely undermined. If the division of Sri Lanka into two sovereign states 
(Tamil Eelam and Sinhalese Sri Lanka) is to be averted, then the present 
Sinhalese government will need to become a truly Sri Lankan government, 
capable and willing to represent and protect minority interests. 
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